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Justice Kennedy’s Free Speech Jurisprudence: A 
Quantitative and Qualitative Analysis 
Ashutosh Bhagwat* and Matthew Struhar** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the almost twenty-five years that Justice Anthony M. Kennedy has served 
on the United States Supreme Court, he has gained a reputation as being the 
foremost defender of free-speech principles on the modern Court. Indeed, 
perhaps aside from his jurisprudence defending the rights of sexual minorities,1 it 
seems likely that Justice Kennedy’s tenure on the Court shall be remembered 
most clearly for his contributions to First Amendment jurisprudence. Justice 
Kennedy has undoubtedly written many important opinions vindicating free-
speech rights, from his concurring opinion in International Society for Krishna 
Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee,2 to his groundbreaking, albeit controversial, decision 
in Citizens United v. FEC.3 On the other hand, Justice Kennedy has also written 
important opinions rejecting First Amendment claims, including Turner 
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC4 and Arkansas Educational Television 
Commission v. Forbes.5 Our modest goal in this Article is to determine whether 
Justice Kennedy’s reputation as a defender of free-speech principles is justified 
given this mixed history. To that end, we undertake both a quantitative and 
qualitative analysis of the Supreme Court’s free speech jurisprudence during the 
period of Justice Kennedy’s tenure on the Court6 to determine whether Justice 
Kennedy has been more likely to support free-speech rights than the Court as a 
whole. This Article first presents a quantitative analysis and then moves to the 
qualitative analysis.  
 
* Professor of Law, UC Davis School of Law (aabhagwat@ucdavis.edu). Thanks to the editors of the 
McGeorge Law Review for organizing this event, and to Professor Clark Kelso for inviting me to participate. 
** J.D. Candidate, UC Davis School of Law, Class of 2013 (mtstruhar@ucdavis.edu). 
1. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
2. 505 U.S. 672 (1992). 
3. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
4. 520 U.S. 180 (1997). 
5. 523 U.S. 666 (1998). 
6. February 11, 1988 through the present. 
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II. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS: WHAT THE NUMBERS SHOW 
In this section, we describe the steps we took to quantitatively analyze Justice 
Kennedy’s First Amendment jurisprudence. We also describe the results of our 
analysis. 
A.  Overall Analysis 
First, we compiled all of the free-speech cases the Supreme Court heard since 
Justice Kennedy joined the Court. To accomplish this, we performed a simple 
Westlaw search in its Supreme Court database. We entered the search term 
“‘First Amendment’ & ‘speech.’” We limited the parameters of the search to 
every opinion the Court issued since the day before Kennedy took his position as 
an Associate Justice. The search generated a universe of cases larger than 
necessary, but it ensured a compilation of all free-speech cases decided while 
Justice Kennedy served on the Court. 
Next, we identified which cases resolved a free speech or association issue 
on the merits. In compiling these cases, we excluded every case not germane to 
either speech or association. This meant excluding cases in which the Court 
denied certiorari or otherwise declined to reach the merits. Also, we excluded 
cases that exclusively involved the religion clauses of the First Amendment. 
Finally and most obviously, we excluded cases in which Justice Kennedy did not 
participate. This led to a total of 141 cases in which the Court addressed an issue 
concerning free speech or the right of expressive association. 
Of these 141 cases, 134 cases determined whether or not the government 
violated the First Amendment. We looked at these 134 cases and noted (1) 
whether the Court found a First Amendment violation; (2) whether Kennedy also 
found a First Amendment violation; and (3) whether Kennedy wrote for the 
Court, wrote a concurring opinion, or wrote a dissenting opinion. Because 
various cases resolved multiple First Amendment issues, we noted whether the 
Court ruled on multiple First Amendment issues in a case, and whether Kennedy 
found First Amendment violations on those individual issues. 
The results showed that Kennedy was significantly more willing to find a 
First Amendment violation than the Court as a whole. Of the 134 cases 
examined, the Court found a First Amendment violation in sixty-four cases, or 
47.8% of the time.7 Kennedy, however, would have found a First Amendment 
violation in seventy-seven cases, or 57.5% of the time.8 When each case is 
broken down into composite issues, the results show a slightly starker contrast 
between Kennedy and the Court. Of the 147 individual free speech or association 
issues in these cases, the Court found sixty-seven First Amendment violations, or 
 
7. See infra Table 1. 
8. Id. 
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in 45.6% of the issues.9 But Kennedy found eighty-five First Amendment 
violations, totaling 57.8% of the issues before the Court.10 
 
Table 1 
 
 Total Number 
of First 
Amendment 
Claims by 
Case 
Number of 
First 
Amendment 
Claims 
Upheld by 
Case 
Total Number 
of First 
Amendment 
Claims by 
Issue 
Number of 
First 
Amendment 
Claims 
Upheld by 
Issue 
The 
Supreme 
Court 
134 64 (47.8%) 147 67 (45.6%) 
Justice 
Kennedy 
134 77 (57.5%) 147 85 (57.8%) 
 
Justice Kennedy wrote prolifically throughout this period, writing forty-one 
opinions in the 134 merits cases in which the Court resolved whether the 
government violated the First Amendment.11 In addition, Kennedy wrote for the 
Court in one of the five cases that resolved a First Amendment issue without 
determining whether there was a violation.12 
Kennedy wrote for the Court in eleven of the sixty-four cases in which the 
Court found a First Amendment violation.13 He also wrote seven concurrences14 
and three opinions concurring in part and dissenting in part.15 As far as our 
 
9. Id. 
10. Id. 
11. Our data does not include cases decided beyond the October 2011 term, but Justice Kennedy 
continues to write opinions supportive of cutting-edge free speech claims. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 
132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012) (Kennedy, J., plurality) (holding that statements do no lose First Amendment protection 
for falsity alone).  
12. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642–43 (1994) (determining that the FCC’s 
must-carry provisions were content-neutral and remanding the case to determine whether the provisions 
violated the First Amendment under a content-neutral analysis). 
13. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002) (Kennedy, J., writing for the 
Court) (holding that the Child Pornography Prevention Act’s prohibition of virtual child pornography violated 
the First Amendment).  In one such case, Kennedy dissented in part, as the Court did not join him in 
invalidating the entire restriction at issue. Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1034 (1991) (holding 
that the Nevada Supreme Court’s interpretation of a Nevada statute was facially invalid under the First 
Amendment, but Justice Kennedy would have invalidated the entire statute). 
14. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420–21 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that the 
symbolic conduct at issue, burning an American flag, was offensive, but that the Court had a duty to protect 
repugnant and unpopular speech). 
15. See, e.g., Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 626 (1996) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (holding that the First Amendment invalidates application of the 
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research indicates, Kennedy never authored a dissenting opinion when the Court 
found a First Amendment violation. 
Of the seventy cases where the Court upheld restrictions against First 
Amendment challenges, Kennedy wrote for the Court in seven instances.16 He 
also authored separate concurrences in seven of these cases,17 dissented in eight,18 
and wrote two opinions concurring in part and dissenting in part.19 
 
Table 2 
 
 Wrote 
for the 
Court 
Wrote a 
Concurrence 
Wrote a 
Concurrence/Dissent
Wrote a 
Dissent 
Cases that 
Upheld First 
Amendment 
Claims 
11 7 3 0 
Cases that 
Denied First 
Amendment 
Claims 
7 7 2 8 
 
 
 
B.  Results by Class of Case 
After compiling the data, we classified each case according to the type of 
First Amendment dispute. We ultimately created twenty-three classifications.20 
Many of the cases were easy to classify, as the Court applied a particular doctrine 
 
Federal Election Campaign Act’s prohibition on political party contributions to a party’s independent 
expenditures). 
16. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) (Kennedy, J., writing for the Court) 
(holding that a municipal noise regulation that required preapproval for particular sound equipment in a public 
park’s band shell did not violate the First Amendment). 
17. See, e.g., Int’l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 693 (1992) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (agreeing with the Court that restrictions on direct solicitations in certain public forums withstood 
First Amendment scrutiny). 
18. See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 636 (1995) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) 
(concluding that the majority failed to consider the societal advantages of attorney advertising in its application 
in upholding a limitation on commercial speech). 
19. See, e.g., Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, 500 U.S. 507 (1991) (holding that a public employees’ 
union could lawfully collect mandatory agency fees from non-members under certain conditions). 
20. The twenty-three categories we classified are, in alphabetical order: Abortion, Association, 
Charitable Donations, Commercial Speech, Compelled Speech, Content-Neutrality, Copyright, Defamation, 
Election Law, Freedom of the Press, Hate Speech, Judicial Process, Labor Law, National Security, Obscenity, 
Overbreadth, Prisoners’ Speech, Public Employees, Public Forum, Students’ Speech, Symbolic Conduct, 
Telecommunications, and Zoning of Adult Establishments.  
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or precedent to resolve the issue, such as the Central Hudson test to determine 
the validity of regulations on commercial speech.21 We classified cases involving 
campaign finance, candidate speech, and ballot access under “Election Law.”22 
Other ballot-access cases, typically involving party primaries, along with cases 
concerning public accommodations, were classified under “Association.”23 We 
classified cases involving public nudity and flag burning under “Symbolic 
Conduct.”24 We classified all cases involving regulations of pornography or 
arguably harmful media content as “Obscenity.”25 
We classified cases involving speech on government property under “Public 
Forum.”26 However, we classified cases involving speech related to abortion, 
including protests near healthcare facilities and the use of Title X funds to 
counsel abortion, under “Abortion.”27 We made this distinction because the 
Justices may reach different conclusions when a case involves a regulation 
 
21. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 489, 508, 516 (1996) (holding that 
Rhode Island’s prohibition on price advertisement of alcohol was an unconstitutional infringement on 
commercial speech). 
22. See, e.g., Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 236–37, 262–63 (2006) (holding that Vermont’s laws 
restricting campaign contributions to political candidates violated the First Amendment); Republican Party of 
Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002) (holding that a provision in Minnesota’s canon of judicial ethics that 
prohibited candidates for judicial office from speaking about their views violated the First Amendment); 
Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 353–54, 369–70 (1997) (holding that Minnesota’s 
“antifusion” law, which prohibited a candidate from appearing on the ballot for more than one party, did not 
violate the First Amendment). 
23. See, e.g., Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 444, 447 (2008) 
(holding that Washington’s “moderated blanket primary,” where each candidate on the ballot could affiliate 
with the party of his choosing regardless of whether the party approved his candidacy, did not violate the First 
Amendment right of association of state political parties); Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 644, 661 
(2000) (holding that New Jersey’s application of its public accommodations law to the Boy Scouts of America 
violated the First Amendment). 
24. See, e.g., City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 282–83 (2000) (holding that Erie’s prohibition 
on public nudity was content neutral and satisfied O’Brien); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 397, 420 (1989) 
(holding that Texas’s law prohibiting flag burning violated the First Amendment as flag burning was expressive 
conduct). 
25. See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2742, 2745 (2011) (holding that video 
games constitute speech for First Amendment purposes, and that violent material, unlike obscene sexual 
material, is not a historically unprotected category of speech); United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1592 
(2010) (holding that the federal government’s ban on depictions of animal cruelty was substantially overbroad 
and thus violated the First Amendment); United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 397, 420 (2008) (holding that 
a federal statute that prohibited the pandering of child pornography did not violate the First Amendment). 
26. See, e.g., Thomas v. Chicago Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 317–18, 323–25 (2002) (holding that 
Chicago’s ordinance requiring event organizers to receive a permit for any event with more than fifty people on 
public property did not violate the First Amendment); Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 102, 
120 (2001) (holding that a public school’s exclusion of a Christian student group from meeting after hours 
violated the First Amendment because the school was engaging in viewpoint discrimination). 
27. See, e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 707–08, 725 (2000) (holding that Colorado’s statute 
prohibiting an individual from approaching another within eight feet outside a healthcare facility without that 
person’s consent was a content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction that did not violate the First 
Amendment); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 177–78 (1991) (holding that prohibiting Title X recipients from 
counseling abortion services did not violate the First Amendment). 
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designed to address antiabortion protests outside healthcare facilities than other 
regulations of speech on government property. 
Other categories we designated included “Freedom of the Press,”28 “Compelled 
Speech,”29 “Defamation,”30 “Copyright,”31 “Hate Speech,”32 “Public Employees,”33 
“Prisoners’ Speech,”34 “Telecommunications,”35 “Zoning of Adult Establishments,”36 
“Students’ Speech,”37 “Labor Law,”38 “Charitable Donations,”39 “Judicial Process,”40 
“Content-Neutrality,”41 “Overbreadth,”42 and “National Security.”43 
 
28. See, e.g., L.A. Police Dep’t v. United Reporting Pub. Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 34, 37 (1999) (upholding a 
statute that limited commercial access to arrestees’ address). Many of the cases filed under Freedom of the Press 
involve rights of access to information from police or access to judicial proceedings. 
29. See, e.g., Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 553, 566–67 (2005) (holding that an 
assessment on beef producers to fund advertising did not violate the First Amendment’s prohibition on 
compelled speech). Many of the cases under this category involved assessments by the United States 
Department of Agriculture on certain groups of farmers in order to finance advertising. 
30. See, e.g., Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 499 (1991) (holding that a summary 
judgment in favor of a media defendant is improper when a material fact question exists as to whether a 
defamatory statement about a public figure was made with actual malice). 
31. See, e.g., Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 877–78 (2012) (holding that a trade agreement’s 
protection of certain copyrighted works that would otherwise fall under the public domain did not violate the 
First Amendment). 
32. See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 347–48, 362–63, 367 (2003) (holding that a prohibition 
against cross-burning, when the act is intended to be threatening, did not violate the First Amendment, but that a 
statutory presumption that made the burning of a cross threatening did violate the First Amendment). 
33. See, e.g., Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2491–93 (2011) (holding that a public 
employee must show that he was speaking as a citizen, not an employee, on a matter of public concern; the 
government must then show that its interest in retaliating outweighed the employee’s speech rights). 
34. See, e.g., Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 524–25 (2006) (holding that a prison does not violate the 
First Amendment when it restricts inmates’ allowable reading materials). 
35. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 185, 224 (1997) (holding that the FCC’s 
must-carry provisions did not violate the First Amendment). 
36. See, e.g., City of Littleton v. Z.J. Gifts D-4, L.L.C., 541 U.S. 774, 776, 784 (2004) (upholding a 
city’s licensing scheme for adult establishments so long as the city establishes a timely appeals process for 
businesses denied licenses). 
37. See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 396–97 (2007) (holding that a school district does not 
violate the First Amendment when it punishes students for promoting drug use off campus but in sight of 
students who are on campus). 
38. See, e.g., Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, 500 U.S. 507, 511 (1991) (upholding a restriction on a 
labor union’s use of agency fees collected from nonunion employees for political purposes). Many of the cases 
that we classified under Labor Law involved whether a restriction on the labor union’s use of agency fees 
violated the union’s First Amendment rights. 
39. See, e.g., Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 605–06, 624 (2003) 
(holding that a state attorney general does not violate the First Amendment by prosecuting a charitable 
organization for fraud). 
40. See, e.g., United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 605–06 (1995) (holding that protective orders 
restricting disclosure made during discovery did not violate the First Amendment). 
41. See, e.g., Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 153, 
165–69 (2002) (holding that requiring a permit for door-to-door petitioners violated the First Amendment as 
applied to political and religious organizations). 
42. See, e.g., Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 124 (2003) (holding that the Richmond Redevelopment 
and Housing Authority’s anti-trespassing rule was not facially overbroad).   
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A number of cases fell under multiple categories. For example, we classified 
cases that involved FCC’s regulations of obscenity on television under both 
“Obscenity” and “Telecommunications.”44 
After classifying the cases, we organized the cases into a spreadsheet and 
sought to determine what areas Justice Kennedy was most willing and least 
willing to find a First Amendment violation.45 Of the twenty-three categories, 
“Election Law” was the largest category with twenty-one cases.46 In fifteen of 
these cases, Justice Kennedy voted in favor of the First Amendment claimants, 
yet the Court only upheld First Amendment claims in eleven cases.47 The next 
largest category was “Obscenity,” with sixteen cases.48 Justice Kennedy upheld 
ten First Amendment claims in Obscenity cases, but the Court did so only nine 
times.49 A close third was “Public Forum,” with fourteen cases.50 Both Justice 
Kennedy and the Court found four First Amendment violations in cases 
involving speech on government property.51 Another large category was 
“Commercial Speech,” which included twelve cases.52 Justice Kennedy found 
free speech violations in all such cases, but the Court was not far behind, as it 
upheld eleven such claims.53 The following table summarizes the frequency with 
which Justice Kennedy and the Court voted to find a First Amendment violation 
within each of the categories we identified.54 Note that cases that fit into multiple 
categories are counted within each category relevant to the respective case. 
 
43. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 30 S. Ct. 2705, 2712 (2010) (holding that the Antiterrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act’s (AEDPA) provision banning material support for terrorist organizations did 
not violate the respondents’ First Amendment rights). 
44. See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp. Ass’n, 529 U.S. 803, 806–07, 827 (2000) (holding 
that the Telecommunications Act’s “signal bleed” provision requiring cable operators to scramble sexually 
explicit channels violated the First Amendment). 
45. See infra Table 3. 
46. Id.  
47. Compare, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (Kennedy, J., writing for the Court) 
(holding that the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act’s (BCRA) limitation on independent corporate, nonprofit, 
and union electioneering expenditures violated the First Amendment), with, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t 
PAC, 528 U.S. 337 (2000) (holding, over a dissent by Justice Kennedy, that Missouri’s campaign contribution 
limitations were sufficiently tailored to survive First Amendment scrutiny). 
48. Id.  
49. Compare, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010) (holding that a federal ban on 
depictions of animal cruelty was substantially overbroad to survive First Amendment scrutiny), with, e.g., 
Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc., v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996) (upholding, over a dissent in 
part by Justice Kennedy, a provision in the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act that 
permitted an operator to prohibit patently offensive or indecent programming on leased access channels). 
50. Id. 
51. See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001) (holding that a school’s 
exclusion of a Christian group from meeting in school facilities after hours was viewpoint discriminatory and 
thus invalid). 
52. See, e.g., Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995) (holding that prohibiting display of a 
beer’s alcohol content violated the First Amendment). 
53. Id. 
54. See infra Table 3. 
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Table 3 
 
Type of Case Total 
Number of 
Cases 
Number of 
Cases with 
Claims Upheld 
Number of Cases 
with Claims 
Upheld by 
Kennedy 
Election Law 21 11 15 
Obscenity 16 9 10 
Public Forum 14 4 4 
Commercial Speech 12 11 12 
Association 9 4 5 
Public Employees 9 4 3 
Judicial Process 6 5 5 
Freedom of the Press 5 3 4 
Compelled Speech 6 2 3 
Abortion 4 0 3 
Labor Law 4 2 3 
Prisoners’ Speech 4 1 1 
Hate Speech 4 3 4 
Defamation 4 1 1 
Symbolic Conduct 3 2 2 
Telecommunications 4 2 2 
Zoning of Adult 
Establishments 
3 0 0 
Charitable Donations 2 1 1 
Content-Neutrality 2 2 2 
Copyright 2 0 0 
National Security 2 0 0 
Overbreadth 2 0 0 
Students’ Speech 1 0 0 
 
 
All in all, although Justice Kennedy’s support for free speech claims often 
depends on the nature of the case, he has still been more willing to hold for free-
speech claimants than the Court as a whole.  
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III. QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS: WHAT THE OPINIONS SHOW 
Our quantitative analysis of Justice Kennedy’s votes in free-speech cases 
clearly demonstrates that Justice Kennedy is significantly more inclined than the 
Court to protect free-speech rights. An examination of Justice Kennedy’s free-
speech opinions suggests that the numbers, if anything, understate Justice 
Kennedy’s commitment to free speech relative to the Court. In particular, the 
numbers fail to catch two important phenomena: first, that Justice Kennedy has 
authored a large and disproportionate number of majority opinions in key First 
Amendment cases during his time on the Court;55 and second, that even in cases 
where Justice Kennedy joined with the majority on free-speech issues (whether 
to uphold or deny a constitutional claim), when he writes separately, he often 
adopts analyses and positions that are substantially more speech-protective than 
the Court as a whole.56 We proceed by considering each of these points in turn. 
A.  Key Cases 
We begin by briefly summarizing what we consider to be some of the most 
important free speech majority opinions authored by Justice Kennedy, in 
chronological order. 
Edenfield v. Fane57: Florida ethical rules prohibited the in-person solicitation 
of clients by certified public accountants (CPAs).58 Fane, a CPA who had recently 
relocated to Florida from New Jersey where such solicitation was permitted, 
challenged the rule.59 The Court, by an 8–1 vote, struck down the regulation as 
violating the First Amendment.60 Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion applied the 
intermediate-scrutiny test of Central Hudson,61 but found that the Florida rule did 
not advance any substantial governmental interest.62 Significantly, the Court 
distinguished an earlier opinion upholding a ban on in-person solicitation of 
clients by lawyers63 on the grounds that such solicitation by CPAs did not raise 
the same concerns about undue influence posed by lawyers.64 
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia65: The 
University of Virginia paid the printing costs of publications issued by student 
 
55. See infra Part III.A. 
56. See infra Part III.B. 
57. 507 U.S. 761 (1993). 
58. Id. at 763. 
59. Id. at 763–64. 
60. Id. at 777.  
61. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). 
62. Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 771. 
63. See id. at 774 (discussing Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978)). 
64. Id. at 774–76. 
65. 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
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groups through its Student Activities Fund (the Fund).66 However, the Fund’s 
guidelines prohibited funding for any “religious activity,” including any 
publication that “primarily promotes or manifests a particular belie[f] in or about 
a deity or an ultimate reality.”67 Invoking this restriction, the Fund refused to pay 
for the publication of a newspaper called Wide Awake: A Christian Perspective at 
the University of Virginia.68 The Court, by a 5–4 vote, held that excluding Wide 
Awake violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.69 In particular, 
the Court held that the Student Activities Fund constituted a limited public 
forum, albeit a “metaphysical” one, and that the exclusion of religious 
publications constituted viewpoint discrimination, which is prohibited by the 
First Amendment.70  
O’Hare Truck Service, Inc. v. City of Northlake71: O’Hare Truck Service 
provided towing services as an independent contractor to the City of Northlake.72 
During a mayoral election, O’Hare and its owner refused to provide campaign 
contributions to the incumbent, but rather supported a challenger.73 As a 
consequence, O’Hare was removed from the list of approved towing companies 
maintained by the City.74 The Court, by a 7–2 vote, held that the First 
Amendment protected the political association and free-speech rights of 
independent contractors on the same terms as public employees, and therefore 
O’Hare had stated a viable First Amendment claim (thereby reversing the 
Seventh Circuit’s holding excluding independent contractors from this form of 
protection).75 
United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group Ass’n76: Congress adopted 
legislation requiring cable operators to take special steps with respect to cable 
channels whose contact was primarily sexually explicit.77 In particular, the statute 
required such channels to either be fully scrambled (for financial reasons, most 
operators only partially scrambled such channels), or be transmitted only during 
late-night hours.78 The purpose was to prevent “signal bleed,” where partially 
scrambled images could be glimpsed by viewers (in particular, by children).79 
 
66. Id. at 822. 
67. Id. at 825. 
68. Id. at 827. 
69. Id. at 837. 
70. Id. at 830–31. The Court also held that funding Wide Awake through the Student Activities Fund 
would not violate the Establishment Clause. Id. at 840–45. 
71. 518 U.S. 712 (1996). 
72. Id. at 715. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. at 720. 
76. 529 U.S. 803 (2000). 
77. Id. at 806. 
78. Id. 
79. Id.  
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Because full scrambling was not financially viable, operators generally 
responded by restricting such channels to late-night hours.80 The Court held, 5–4, 
that the full scrambling requirement was a content-based restriction on fully 
protected speech, and that it was unconstitutional because less-restrictive means 
existed by which Congress could achieve its goal of protecting children.81 
Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez82: The Legal Services Corporation 
distributes funds appropriated by Congress to local organizations that provide 
legal services to the poor.83 Congress enacted a restriction prohibiting the funding 
of any organization that represented clients who sought to amend or challenge 
any welfare law.84 The Court struck down this restriction by a 6–3 vote.85 
Drawing upon his earlier Rosenberger opinion, Justice Kennedy concluded that 
this statute did not restrict government speech; it constituted a discriminatory 
subsidy for private speech.86 He then held that the restriction was unconstitutional 
because it had a substantial impact on lawyers’ ability to properly represent their 
clients and courts’ ability to properly adjudicate legal claims.87 
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition88: Child pornography is, of course, 
unprotected under the First Amendment.89 Congress passed a statute prohibiting 
“virtual” child pornography, meaning visual depictions that appear to be of 
minors engaging in sexual activity, but may not involve any actual minors 
(typically because the image was created either using a computer or an adult 
actor who merely looks underage).90 The Court struck down the statute by a 6–3 
vote.91 First, the Court clarified that the statute could not be upheld as prohibiting 
unprotected speech because virtual child pornography does not involve the actual 
sexual abuse of a child and does not implicate the same concerns as actual child 
pornography.92 The Court also rejected the government’s claims that the ban was 
necessary because virtual child pornography might be used by pedophiles to lure 
children or to whet their own appetites.93 Finally, the Court rejected the idea that 
potential prosecutorial difficulties in convicting those who possess actual child 
pornography justified a ban on virtual child pornography.94 
 
80. Id. at 806, 809. 
81. Id. at 811–15. 
82. 531 U.S. 533 (2001). 
83. Id. at 536. 
84. Id. at 536–37. 
85. Id. at 535.  
86. Id. at 542–43. 
87. Id. at 542–44, 548–49. 
88. 535 U.S. 234 (2002). 
89. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 773–74 (1982). 
90. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 239–40. 
91. Id. at 238, 256. 
92. Id. at 250–51. 
93. Id. at 253–54. 
94. Id. at 254–56. 
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Ashcroft v. ACLU95: In response to the Court’s decision in Reno v. ACLU,96 
which unanimously struck down an across-the-board prohibition on posting to or 
sending over the Internet of “indecent” material if the material might be accessed 
by minors, Congress adopted the Child Online Protection Act (COPA).97 COPA 
adopted a narrower ban, limited to the posting of materials to commercial 
websites material which is “harmful to minors,” unless the website uses a 
screening mechanism to confirm that viewers were adults.98 This time the Court 
struck down the law by a 5–4 vote.99 The Court held that COPA was a content-
based restriction on protected speech and was not narrowly tailored because less 
restrictive means to protect children already existed (in particular, the Court 
pointed to encouraging the use of software filters as the primary alternative).100 
Citizens United v. FEC101: Federal law prohibits corporations and labor 
unions from using general treasury funds to engage in “electioneering 
communication,” defined as a broadcast, cable, or satellite communication that 
“refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office” within certain time 
periods before primary or general elections.102 The Court struck down the 
prohibition in its entirety by a 5–4 vote.103 The Court held that the prohibition was 
a direct restriction on core political speech, and that the corporate identity of the 
restricted speakers was irrelevant.104 It also rejected the government’s rationales 
for the legislation, including an “antidistortion” justification,105 and the argument 
that the law was necessary to prevent “corruption or the appearance of 
corruption.”106 As such, the law clearly violated the First Amendment.107 
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.108: Vermont adopted a statute prohibiting 
pharmacies from selling information regarding the prescribing habits of 
physicians if the information was going to be used by pharmaceutical companies 
to market prescription drugs.109 A group of pharmaceutical companies and data-
 
95. 542 U.S. 656 (2004). 
96. 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
97. ACLU, 542 U.S. at 659–60. 
98. Id. at 661–62. 
99. Id. at 659, 673. 
100. Id. at 666–67. 
101. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
102. Id. at 887 (quoting 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A) (2006)). Federal law had long prohibited the use of such 
funds to make direct contributions to candidates, or to expressly advocate the election of defeat of a candidate. 
The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), better known as the McCain-Feingold bill, extended 
the prohibition to all electioneering communications. Id. 
103. Id. at 886.  
104. Id. 
105. Id. at 904–08. 
106. Id. at 908–11. 
107. Id. at 917. 
108. 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011). 
109. Id. at 2660. 
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mining companies (who, in the past, had purchased and analyzed such prescriber-
identifying information and then sold the results to pharmaceuticals) challenged 
the statute.110 The Court, by a 6–3 vote, sustained their challenge.111 In dicta, the 
Court strongly suggested that the ban on the sale of information was in itself a 
content- and speaker-based restriction on protected speech.112 Ultimately, 
however, because Vermont only prohibited the sale of such information for 
marketing purposes, the Court invoked the commercial speech doctrine.113 The 
majority concluded that the Vermont statute could not even survive the Central 
Hudson intermediate-scrutiny test applicable to restrictions on commercial 
speech,114 and thereby avoided the broader question of whether laws banning the 
sale of data directly implicated the First Amendment.115 
Of course, the above is not a complete list of Justice Kennedy’s majority 
opinions in free-speech cases, nor is it a product of any sort of empirical analysis 
of the importance or influence of particular opinions; instead, it is a product of 
our judgment. However, it is extremely revealing. The first thing that jumps out 
from these opinions is the sheer variety of the kinds of speech Justice Kennedy 
protected. These cases involve everything from religious speech (Rosenberger)116 
to campaign expenditures (Citizens United)117 to the speech of government 
employees and contractors (O’Hare Trucking)118 to legal advocacy (Legal 
Services Corp.)119 to commercial speech (Sorrell)120 to sexually explicit speech 
(Playboy Entertainment and the two Ashcroft cases).121 Thus, the list confirms 
what our empirical analysis suggests: unlike many of his colleagues, Justice 
Kennedy is an equal-opportunity defender of free speech, and does not play 
favorites among different kinds of speech. Instead, his jurisprudence protects 
speech uniformly without regard to the perceived value of the speech at issue. 
Our analysis of Justice Kennedy’s First Amendment opinions also shows that 
he has helped shape core aspects of free-speech law over the last two decades. 
For example, the Rosenberger decision developed free-speech law in two critical 
ways. First, Rosenberger established that the Court’s public forum doctrine, and 
its critical requirement of viewpoint neutrality, extended not just to access to 
 
110. Id. at 2661. 
111. Id. at 2672. 
112. Id. at 2663–65. 
113. Id. at 2667. 
114. Id. at 2667–68 (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 
557, 566 (1980)). 
115. Id. at 2672. 
116. 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
117. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
118. 518 U.S. 712 (1996). 
119. 531 U.S. 533 (2001). 
120. 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011). 
121. United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp. Ass’n, 529 U.S. 803 (2000); Ashcroft v. Free Speech 
Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002); Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656 (2004). 
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physical property, but also to funding decisions.122 Thus, Rosenberger identified 
an important limit on the Court’s earlier decision in Rust v. Sullivan,123 holding 
that when the government speaks itself or pays others to speak on its behalf, its 
choices are not subject to significant First Amendment scrutiny.124 Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion in Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez confirmed and extended 
certain aspects of Rosenberger.125 Legal Services applied the nondiscrimination 
requirement to government funding even when the funding program’s “purpose 
[was] not to ‘encourage a diversity of views,’”126 and so did not constitute a 
public forum. Second, Rosenberger was an important step in the line of cases 
establishing that discrimination against religious speech constitutes viewpoint-
based discrimination.127 Whatever the pitfalls of this approach may be,128 there is 
no doubt that it has had a substantial impact on an important and heavily litigated 
area of First Amendment law. 
Justice Kennedy’s jurisprudence has also substantially influenced the 
development of the commercial speech doctrine. Edenfield v. Fane, which struck 
down Florida’s ban on in-person solicitation of clients by CPAs, was not itself a 
highly contested decision—it was, after all, decided by an 8–1 vote, and in 
retrospect, it seems like a straightforward result.129 However, it is important to 
remember that when the case was decided in 1993, the Court’s commercial 
speech jurisprudence was in deep retreat. As a result of a series of decisions 
hostile towards commercial speech protections, including Ohralik v. State Bar 
Ass’n, upholding limits on in-person solicitation by lawyers,130 as well as Posados 
de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico131 and Board of Trustees 
of State University of New York v. Fox,132 it was widely believed that the Court 
had turned its back on earlier cases promising substantial constitutional 
protections for commercial speech. Edenfield v. Fane, however (along with City 
 
122. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830–31 (1995). 
123. 500 U.S. 173, 177–78, 203 (1991). This principle has come to be called the “government speech” 
doctrine. 
124. Id. at 177–78, 203; Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833. 
125. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 533 U.S. 553, 542 (2001). 
126. Id.  
127. See, e.g., Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993); Good News 
Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001). 
128. For a penetrating criticism of the Court’s attempt to equate religion with a viewpoint, see Alan 
Brownstein & Vikram Amar, Reviewing Associational Freedom Claims in a Limited Public Forum: An 
Extension of the Distinction Between Debate-Dampening and Debate-Distorting State Action, 38 HASTINGS 
CON. L. Q. 505, 536–39 (2011). 
129. 507 U.S. 761, 762–63 (1993). 
130. 436 U.S. 412 (1978). 
131. 478 U.S. 328 (1986) (upholding a Puerto Rico law legalizing casino gambling, but forbidding 
casino advertising directed at residents of Puerto Rico). 
132. 492 U.S. 469 (1989) (upholding a regulation prohibiting commercial enterprises in student dorms, 
and clarifying that the “narrow tailoring” requirement of the commercial speech doctrine requires only a 
reasonable fit). 
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of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.,133 decided just one month earlier), 
suggested that the Court’s interest in commercial speech had been revived. In a 
series of decisions since 1993, the Court has extended extremely robust 
protection to commercial speech.134 Justice Kennedy’s most recent contribution to 
this area of law suggests that this protection has progressed very far indeed. 
That contribution was his 2011 majority opinion in Sorrell v. IMS Health 
Inc.135 Sorrell, though a recent opinion, is also likely in its time to have a very 
significant influence on commercial speech, as well as on First Amendment 
doctrine more generally.136 First, Justice Kennedy’s Sorrell opinion takes 
important steps towards merging the commercial speech doctrine with general 
free-speech law, thus abandoning the long-held notion that truthful, non-
misleading commercial speech is low-value speech.137 By criticizing the Vermont 
statute as content- and speaker-based, even when applying the commercial 
speech doctrine, the Court strongly suggested that such laws should be subject to 
strict scrutiny.138 Ultimately, Justice Kennedy did not take this final step of 
abandoning intermediate scrutiny because he concluded it was unnecessary in 
this case. However, the writing certainly seems to be on the wall—as the dissent 
explicitly recognizes (and bemoans).139 The second, and perhaps even more 
significant contribution of this opinion, is Justice Kennedy’s strong suggestion 
that the sale of data is in itself a speech act, a fully protected form of speech, 
because “[f]acts . . . are the beginning point for much of the speech that is most 
essential to advance human knowledge and to conduct human affairs.”140 The 
implications of this premise, if followed in later cases, are profound for the 
burgeoning field of data privacy, and more generally for the shape of First 
Amendment doctrine.141 
Far removed from religious and commercial speech, but also critical to the 
development of free-speech law, is the trilogy of cases authored by Justice 
Kennedy dealing with sexually explicit speech: Playboy Entertainment,142 
 
133. 507 U.S. 410 (1993). 
134. See, e.g., Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 514 U.S. 476 (1995); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode 
Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996); Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173 (1999); 
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001); Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 (2002). 
In cases during this period where the Court has rejected commercial speech claims, Justice Kennedy has tended 
to dissent. See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995). 
135. 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011). 
136. For a more detailed discussion of the potential significance of Sorrell, see Ashutosh Bhagwat, 
Sorrell v. IMS Health: Details, Detailing, and the Death of Privacy, 36 VT. L. REV. 855 (2012). 
137. See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 562–63 
(1980). 
138. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2663–65. 
139. Id. at 2677–79 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
140. Id. at 2666–67. 
141. For a fuller development of this issue, see Bhagwat, Sorrell v. IMS Health: Details, Detailing, and 
the Death of Privacy, supra note 136. 
142. United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp. Ass’n, 529 U.S. 803 (2000).  
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Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition,143 and Ashcroft v. ACLU.144 These cases clearly 
establish that sexually explicit speech that falls short of the obscenity standard is 
fully protected by the First Amendment, and therefore content-based regulations 
of such speech trigger strict scrutiny.145 Playboy and Ashcroft v. ACLU also 
establish the important principle that when the state seeks to shield minors from 
“indecent” materials, the First Amendment creates a strong preference for 
regulatory strategies that empower parents to make choices, as opposed to 
regulations that simply impose the government’s will.146 Finally, and perhaps 
most significantly, the Free Speech Coalition decision announced the modern 
Court’s hostility toward creating or expanding categories of unprotected speech 
by declining to extend the unprotected category of child pornography to include 
virtual child pornography.147 That approach has been applied in recent years to 
fundamentally restructure First Amendment law, by abandoning the technique of 
“categorical balancing” to create new such categories.148 
The O’Hare trucking case,149 while perhaps less epochal than the other 
doctrinal developments we have discussed, is also an important decision. The 
issue in O’Hare was the reach of earlier decisions by the Supreme Court holding 
that patronage hiring and firing of public employees, that is, the conditioning of 
public employment on the provision of political support to office holders, 
violated the First Amendment.150 The earlier decisions were highly controversial 
and decided over strong dissents from more conservative justices.151 Therefore, 
the Court’s willingness to extend the scope of these holdings to independent 
contractors152 sent a strong signal that despite the more conservative turn of the 
Court in intervening years, the Court remained committed to those earlier 
decisions and to protecting the speech and associational rights of public 
employees. 
 
143. 535 U.S. 234 (2002). 
144. 542 U.S. 656 (2004).  
145. Even when the Court has not fully adhered to this position, Justice Kennedy has. See, e.g., Denver 
Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 780–812 (1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring in 
part, concurring in judgment in part, and dissenting in part). 
146. For a detailed discussion of this aspect of these cases, see Ashutosh Bhagwat, What If I Want My 
Kids to Watch Pornography?: Protecting Children from “Indecent” Speech, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 671 
(2003). 
147. 535 U.S. at 249. 
148. See Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2734 (2011); United States v. Stevens, 130 S. 
Ct. 1577, 1585 (2010). 
149. O’Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712 (1996). 
150. Id. at 720 (discussing Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976), Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980), 
and Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62 (1990)). 
151. See Elrod, 427 U.S. at 375–76 (providing Burger, C.J., and Powell, J., dissenting opinions); Branti, 
445 U.S. at 520–21 (providing Stewart, J., and Powell, J., dissenting opinions); Rutan, 497 U.S. at 92 (providing 
Scalia, J., dissenting opinion). 
152. O’Hare, 518 U.S. at 726.  
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Finally, we come to Citizens United.153 For all the controversy it has 
provoked,154 no one doubts the significance of this decision. It has fundamentally 
restructured the law of campaign finance reform. The holding itself, banning any 
and all restrictions on independent expenditures by corporations and unions 
funding political speech,155 was significant enough. But perhaps even more so 
were the broader themes of Justice Kennedy’s opinion, which expressed deep 
skepticism about campaign finance regulation generally,156 and expressed 
skepticism more specifically about concerns that campaign spending threatens to 
create corruption, or the appearance of corruption, even when there is no 
apparent danger of quid pro quo bribery.157 Lower courts have relied on this part 
of the opinion to strike down a broad range of restrictions on political spending 
and contributions, not involving direct contributions to candidates, including 
restrictions on contributions to political action committees which are (at least 
purportedly) run independently of candidates and campaigns.158 It has been 
argued that this legal development has led to the rise and significance of so-
called Super PACs in the 2012 presidential election.159 It cannot seriously be 
doubted that these organizations have fundamentally changed the tone and 
dynamics of the campaign.160 Thus, Justice Kennedy’s opinion has not only 
upended the law of campaign finance, it has very probably upended national 
politics more generally. 
In short, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinions, applying and extending the 
Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment, have had a profound influence on 
the development of the law in this area. But not every important free-speech 
opinion Justice Kennedy has authored has upheld a constitutional claim. An 
 
153. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
154. See Barak Obama, President of the United States, Remarks by the President in State of the Union 
Address (Jan. 27, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-state-
union-address (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (criticizing the Citizens United decision). 
155. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 917.  
156. Id. at 895. 
157. Id. at 908–09. 
158. See, e.g., Thalheimer v. City of San Diego, 645 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2011); Wis. Right to Life State 
PAC v. Barland, 664 F.3d 139 (7th Cir. 2011); Farris v. Seabrook, 667 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2010); 
Speechnow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
159. See, e.g., Fred Wertheimer, Citizens United and Contributions to Super PACs: A Little History Is in 
Order, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 21, 2012, 4:35 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/fred-wertheimer/citizens-
united-and-contr_b_1291465.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); Peter Overby, As “Citizens 
United” Turns 2, Super PACs Draw Protests, NPR (Jan. 20, 2012), http://www.npr.org/2012/01/20/145500168 
/superpacs-celebrate-anniversary-of-citizens-united-case (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
160. See, e.g., Nicholas Confessor & Michael Luo, Obama Campaign Fears Uphill Climb Raising 
‘Super PAC’ Money, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2012, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2012/03/14/us/politics/obama-campaign-fears-uphill-climb-raising-super-pac-money.html?_r=1&scp=2&sq= 
SuperPAcs&st=cse (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); Jeremy W. Peters, ‘Super PACs,’ Not Campaigns, 
Do Bulk of Ad Spending, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/03/us/politics/super-
pacs-not-campaigns-do-bulk-of-ad-spending.html?scp=7&sq=Super%20PAcs&st=cse (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review). 
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examination of three critical Kennedy opinions rejecting free speech claims 
reveals a very interesting pattern.161 The first is Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. 
v. FCC.162 In this case (along with its earlier incarnation in the Court, also 
authored by Justice Kennedy),163 the Court, by a 5–4 vote, upheld a federal statute 
that required cable television operators to dedicate up to one-third of their total 
channel capacity to carrying the signals of local television broadcast stations free 
of charge.164 The denial of the cable operators’ First Amendment claims was, of 
course, a defeat for their free-speech rights.165 Interestingly, however, the impact 
of this statute was not to simply silence or censor speech, it was to enhance the 
speech of some speakers—broadcast stations—at the expense of others—cable 
television programmers.166 Furthermore, the justification the federal government 
offered for the regulation, which the Court accepted, was that it was necessary to 
ensure the continuing survival of the free over-the-air broadcast television 
industry, which allegedly faced financial challenges because of discriminatory 
carriage decisions by cable operators.167 In other words, the impact of the law 
upheld by the Court was to preserve a particular, distinct voice—local broadcast 
stations—and to ensure that the millions of Americans who do not subscribe to 
pay television retained access to speech via television. Therefore, the net effect of 
the law was to (at least arguably) enhance rather than reduce the total amount of 
speech in the marketplace.168 Describing this as an anti-speech decision is highly 
questionable. 
Consider also Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. Forbes,169 
where the Court upheld the right of a public television station hosting a debate 
among congressional candidates to exclude a candidate who had not attracted 
substantial public support.170 In reaching its conclusion, Justice Kennedy’s 
majority opinion makes a critical point, arguing that restricting the debate 
organizers’ discretion on these sorts of matters “would result in less speech, not 
more.”
171
 If the organizers are unable to focus the debate on viable candidates, the 
debate’s expressive and educational value may well be reduced, and organizers 
may decide not to hold such a debate at all under such conditions.172 Once again, 
Justice Kennedy rejecting a First Amendment claim was based at least in part on 
 
161. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997); 
Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998). 
162. 520 U.S. 180. 
163. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994). 
164. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 520 U.S. at 185. 
165. See id. 
166. See id. at 191. 
167. Id. at 193.  
168. Id. at 203. 
169. 523 U.S. 666 (1998). 
170. Id. at 669. 
171. Id. at 680. 
172. Id. at 681. 
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his view that the challenged regulation’s effect was speech-enhancing rather than 
limiting. 
Finally, we must consider Garcetti v. Ceballos.173 In this case, the Court held 
that the First Amendment did not protect the speech of government employees if 
the expression was pursuant to an employee’s official duties.174 Unlike Turner175 
and Arkansas Educational Television Commission,176 it is less clear that the net 
effect of the Garcetti decision was to enhance speech. However, it is clear that 
when a public employee speaks pursuant to his or her official duties (as opposed 
to when the employee speaks as a citizen, even if the topic touches upon the 
employee’s job), the employee is not making a personal contribution to public 
debate.177 Indeed, in Garcetti, the relevant speech was an internal memo, which 
made no contribution to public debate.178 Even when the speech at issue is public, 
however, it is not his or her contribution to public debate when it is made in the 
course of an employee’s duties; it is the government’s contribution. Indeed, a 
government’s inability to control its employees’ speech on the government’s 
behalf would obviously have a serious negative impact on the government’s own 
ability to speak at all, since governments are juridical entities which always 
speak through agents. Thus, it is not clear that the net impact of Garcetti is to 
substantially reduce the quantity and quality of public debate. 
B.  Separate Opinions 
An examination of Justice Kennedy’s majority opinions in free-speech cases 
demonstrates the important contributions he has made to the development of 
free-speech law in the modern era.179 A similar and even more striking pattern 
emerges when one looks at free-speech cases where Justice Kennedy wrote 
separate concurring or dissenting opinions. These cases demonstrate that even 
when Justice Kennedy joins a majority in accepting or rejecting a First 
Amendment claim, he often does so on grounds that are far more speech-
protective than those adopted by other justices. There are many examples of 
those opinions from Justice Kennedy’s tenure on the Court, but we will focus on 
an illustrative few.180 
 
173. 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
174. Id. at 420–21. 
175. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997). 
176. 523 U.S. 666. 
177. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421–22. 
178. Id. 
179. See supra Part III.A. 
180.  United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194 (2003); Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 
536 U.S. 765 (2002); Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992); Lee v. Int'l Soc'y 
for Krishna Consciousness Inc., 505 U.S. 830 (1992); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State 
Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105 (1991). 
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Probably the most striking example of the phenomenon described above is 
the Court’s decision in International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. 
Lee.181 The parties to the case took issue with regulations prohibiting the sale or 
distribution of literature or the solicitation of funds within the public areas of the 
three New York City airports.182 The Court ultimately struck down the first 
regulation prohibiting the distribution of literature, but upheld the ban on 
solicitation.183 Justice Kennedy concurred in both of those results (he and Justice 
O’Connor were the only two members of the Court to agree with both results).184 
So seemingly, Justice Kennedy’s First Amendment position was the median one 
on the Court.185 But appearances can be deceptive. The critical doctrinal issue in 
the case was not the validity of the specific regulations, but rather what sort of a 
public forum the public spaces of airports constitute.186 Here, the majority took a 
highly restrictive stance and denied airports public forum status because airports 
were not spaces traditionally open to speech (given their recent provenance), nor 
had the government intentionally opened airports up to speech.187 Justice 
Kennedy (joined by three other justices) took a very different tack and argued 
that the public forum “inquiry must be an objective one, based on the actual, 
physical characteristics and uses of the property.”188 More broadly, he decried the 
direction the Court’s public forum doctrine was taking, complaining that “[o]ur 
public forum doctrine ought not to be a jurisprudence of categories rather than 
ideas or convert what was once an analysis protective of expression into one 
which grants the government authority to restrict speech by fiat.”189 Justice 
Kennedy thus found the ban on distribution of literature clearly constitutional.190 
He voted to uphold the ban on solicitation only because he found its focus on the 
in-person solicitation and receipt of money to be akin to a regulation of conduct, 
or the manner of speech, rather than a direct regulation of speech itself.191 On the 
primary issue before the Court, however, Justice Kennedy took one of the most 
speech-protective approaches to the public forum doctrine in the history of the 
 
181. 505 U.S. 672. 
182. Id. at 675–76. 
183. Id. at 683–85. 
184. Id. at 686–87 (O’Conner, J., concurring); id. at 693 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment); Lee, 505 
U.S. 830. 
185. See Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 505 U.S. at 686–87 (O’Connor, J., concurring); id. 
at 693 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).  
186. Id. at 680–81. 
187. Id.  
188. Id. at 695 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment). 
189. Id. at 694–95.  
190. Lee, 505 U.S. 830; see also Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 505 U.S. 672 (providing 
the rationale for the decision in Lee). 
191. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 505 U.S. at 703–09 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the 
judgment). 
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Court. If his approach had prevailed, that doctrine would look very different, and 
far more speech-protective, than it does today. 
Another area of First Amendment doctrine where Justice Kennedy has taken 
a significantly more speech-protective approach than the majority (indeed, on 
this issue Justice Kennedy has moved beyond any other member of the Court) is 
illustrated by two decisions spanning a decade: Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. 
Members of New York State Crime Victims Board192 and Republican Party of 
Minnesota v. White.193 In both cases, a majority (in Simon & Schuster, a 
unanimous majority) voted to strike down restrictions on speech: in Simon & 
Schuster, a law requiring proceeds from books written by convicted criminals 
describing their crimes to be held in escrow for crime victims,194 and in White, a 
Minnesota ethical rule banning candidates in judicial elections from speaking 
about their views on legal or political issues.195 In both cases, the majority found 
the law to be content-based and applied strict scrutiny.196 Justice Kennedy wrote 
separately in both cases to argue that content-based restrictions on speech (other 
than regulations of the public forum) should not be subject to strict scrutiny, but 
should be per se unconstitutional.197 Particularly in Simon & Schuster, Justice 
Kennedy pointed out that incorporating the strict-scrutiny test into free-speech 
analysis was essentially a historical accident, which occurred when the Court 
quoted a case involving the Equal Protection Clause without realizing what it was 
doing.198 He also argued that leaving open even the possibility that a content-
based restriction on private speech might be upheld undermined the fundamental 
premise of the First Amendment that “above all else, the First Amendment means 
that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its 
ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”199 Once again, if the Court had followed 
Justice Kennedy’s lead, free speech law would have been significantly 
liberalized. 
Consider also United States v. American Library Ass’n.200 In this case, the 
Court upheld, against a facial challenge, a federal statute that conditioned receipt 
of federal funds for public libraries on the libraries installing filtering software on 
Internet-accessible computers that blocked minors from accessing visual images 
harmful to them.201 The plurality opinion broadly defended the right of libraries to 
 
192. 502 U.S. 105 (1991). 
193. 536 U.S. 765 (2002). 
194. 502 U.S. at 108. 
195. 536 U.S. at 768.  
196. See Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 119; White, 536 U.S. at 774.  
197. Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 124–28 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment); White, 536 U.S. at 
793 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
198. Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 125 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment). 
199. Id. at 126 (quoting Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972)). 
200. 539 U.S. 194 (2003). 
201. Id. at 199, 201. 
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filter access to the Internet and the right of the federal government to condition 
funding as it chooses.202 Justice Kennedy declined to join this opinion, which 
would have granted libraries extraordinarily broad censorship powers.203 Instead, 
he wrote separately, emphasizing that in this case, the government had asserted 
that upon the request of an adult, librarians could unblock computers with little 
delay.204 As Justice Kennedy said, given this concession, “there is little to this 
case.”
205
 Importantly, however, Justice Kennedy emphasized that if some libraries 
did not have the capacity to unblock computers, then an as-applied challenge to 
the statute would be available.206 In other words, he declined to join the plurality’s 
broad rejection of serious First Amendment issues in the case, and thereby 
preserved the possibility that censorship of library computers for adult patrons 
might be challenged in the future.207 
The above discussion does not fully explore the contexts in which Justice 
Kennedy has sought, in his separate opinions, to push free-speech law in more 
speech-protective directions. For example, we have not discussed Justice 
Kennedy’s consistent and vigorous defense of the rights of abortion protestors in 
the face of general hostility on the Court.208 Nor have we mentioned the many 
separate opinions Justice Kennedy filed in campaign finance cases prior to his 
path-breaking decision in Citizens United.209 Even limiting ourselves to the 
highlights, what is abundantly clear is that Justice Kennedy’s separate opinions in 
free-speech cases, even more so than his majority opinions, place him firmly on 
the most consistently speech-protective end of the spectrum of Justices who have 
served with him on the Supreme Court. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Our task here was to explore whether a quantitative and qualitative analysis 
of the Supreme Court’s free-speech decisions during Justice Kennedy’s tenure on 
the Court tends to confirm or disprove Justice Kennedy’s reputation as perhaps 
the foremost defender of free-speech principles on the modern Court. Our 
conclusion: his reputation is fully deserved. It is not that Justice Kennedy always 
 
202. Id. at 208, 211–12. 
203. Id. at 214 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment). 
204. Id. at 214–15. 
205. Id. at 214. 
206  Id. at 215. 
207. Id. at 214–15. 
208. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 765–92 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also Schenck v. 
Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357, 385–95 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); 
Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 784–820 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
209. See, e.g., Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 695–713 (1990) (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 286–341 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part 
and dissenting in part); Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 264–65 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the 
judgment). 
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votes to accept free-speech claims; our quantitative analysis demonstrates that he 
clearly does not. He does, however, vote in favor of free-speech claims more 
consistently than the Court as a whole.210 It is also noteworthy that Justice 
Kennedy’s receptivity to free-speech arguments is not limited to specific 
substantive areas such as campaign finance reform, abortion protestors, 
commercial speech, or sexually explicit speech—it runs across the range of First 
Amendment claims and issues. There also does not appear to be any temporal 
pattern to Justice Kennedy’s voting in free-speech cases. From his (albeit 
reluctant) crucial fifth vote to strike down a ban on flag burning during his first 
full term on the Court211 to his recent decisions in Citizens United212 and Sorrell,213 
he has been a consistent voice for free speech, especially for the protection of 
speech despised by society at large. This is an area where Justice Kennedy’s 
jurisprudence has not evolved. 
If any pattern emerges from an examination of Justice Kennedy’s free-speech 
jurisprudence, it is that his views in this area are deeply rooted in his libertarian 
distrust of government and his firm conviction that the liberties protected by the 
First Amendment are an integral aspect of the process of democratic self-
governance through which “We the People” ensure that government respects our 
liberties. Most clearly, this results in his interpreting the First Amendment to 
maximize the scope of and opportunities for democratic discourse, as illustrated 
by cases such as International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc.214 and 
Citizens United.215 His opinions also seek to ensure that no voice, no matter how 
disruptive or unpopular, is excluded from public debate, as illustrated by 
decisions such as Rosenberger,216 Velasquez,217 the abortion protestor decisions, 
and Citizens United.218 Finally, and most broadly, Justice Kennedy’s views in this 
area reflect an overarching desire to ensure that government is not in a position to 
legislate the moral values of its citizens, as demonstrated by his willingness in 
cases such as Playboy Entertainment219 and the Ashcroft decisions220 to strike 
down regulations of even sexually explicit speech. This principle connects 
Justice Kennedy’s free-speech opinions with his important decisions in the areas 
of privacy and the rights of sexual minorities, notably Planned Parenthood of 
 
210. See supra Table 1 (summarizing Justice Kennedy’s voting record in finding a First Amendment 
violation as compared to the Court as a whole).  
211. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420–21 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
212. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).  
213. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011). 
214. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992).  
215. 130 S. Ct. 876. 
216. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
217. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velasquez, 521 U.S. 533 (2001). 
218. 130 S. Ct. 876.  
219. United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp. Ass’n, 529 U.S. 803 (2000). 
220. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656 (2004); Aschroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002). 
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Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,221 Romer v. Evans,222 and Lawrence v. 
Texas,223 in that both sets of cases reflect Justice Kennedy’s abiding belief in the 
value of liberty, and in the primacy of the individual over the State. As 
jurisprudential legacies go, that is not a bad one. 
 
221. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
222. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
223. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
06_BHAGWAT ET AL_VER_01_5-18-12_FINAL.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 7/22/2013 2:34 PM 
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 44 
191 
APPENDIX 
CASE KENNEDY’S ROLE 
ABORTION 
Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 
(2000). 
Dissenting, would have found a 
violation. 
Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 
U.S. 357 (1997). 
The Court found no First Amendment 
violation; Justice Kennedy joined 
Justice Scalia’s opinion concurring in 
part and dissenting in part. 
Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 
512. U.S. 753 (1994). 
The Court found no First Amendment 
violation; Justice Kennedy joined 
Justice Scalia’s opinion concurring in 
part and dissenting in part.  
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991). Joined the majority, finding no 
violation. 
ASSOCIATION 
Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State 
Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442 
(2008). 
The Court found no First Amendment 
violation; Justice Kennedy joined 
Justice Scalia’s dissent and would have 
found a violation. 
Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. 
Brentwood Acad., 551 U.S. 291 
(2007). 
Filed a separate opinion, concurring in 
part and judgment in upholding the 
restriction. 
Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581 
(2005). 
Joined with the majority in upholding 
the restriction. 
Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 
640 (2000). 
Joined with the majority in finding a 
violation. 
Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 
U.S. 567 (2000). 
Filed a separate concurring opinion that 
struck down the restriction. 
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, 
Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 
515 U.S. 557 (1995). 
Joined with the Court in finding a 
violation. 
City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19 
(1989). 
Joined with the majority in upholding 
the restriction. 
N.Y. State Club Ass’n, Inc. v. City of 
New York, 487 U.S. 1 (1988). 
The Court found no First Amendment 
violation; Justice Kennedy joined 
Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion. 
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CHARITABLE DONATIONS 
Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. 
Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S. 
600 (2003). 
Joined with the majority in upholding 
the restriction. 
Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of 
N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781 (1988). 
Joined with the majority in striking 
down all restrictions as violating the 
First Amendment. 
COMMERCIAL SPEECH 
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 
2653 (2011). 
Writing for the majority, found a 
violation. 
Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 
U.S. 357 (2002). 
Joined with the majority in finding a 
violation. 
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 
U.S. 525 (2001). 
Filed a separate concurring opinion, 
found a violation for two of the four 
regulations.  
Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. 
United States, 527 U.S. 173 (1999). 
Joined with the majority in finding a 
violation. 
44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 
517 U.S. 484 (1996). 
Joined with the majority in finding a 
violation.  
Fla. Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 
618 (1995). 
Filed a separate dissenting opinion, 
would have found a violation. 
Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 
476 (1995). 
Joined with the majority in finding a 
violation.  
United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 
U.S. 418 (1993). 
Joined with the majority in part and 
Justice Souter’s concurrence in part, in 
which both found a violation.  
Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 
(1993). 
Writing for the majority, found a 
violation. 
City of Cincinnati v. Discovery 
Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993). 
Joined with the majority in finding a 
violation. 
Peel v. Attorney Registration & 
Disciplinary Comm’n of Ill., 496 U.S. 
91 (1990). 
Joined with the majority in finding a 
violation. 
Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 486 U.S. 
466 (1988). 
Joined with the plurality in finding a 
violation. 
COMPELLED SPEECH 
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 
U.S. 460 (2009). 
Joined with the majority in finding no 
violation. 
Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 
U.S. 550 (2005). 
Writing a dissenting opinion and joining 
Justice Souter’s dissenting opinion, 
would have found a violation.  
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United States v. United Foods, Inc., 
533 U.S. 405 (2001). 
Writing for the majority, found a 
violation. 
Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, 
Inc., 521 U.S. 457 (1997). 
Joined with the majority in finding no 
violation. 
Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1 
(1990). 
Joined with the majority in finding a 
violation. 
CONTENT-NEUTRALITY 
Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of 
N.Y., Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 536 
U.S. 150 (2002). 
Joined with the majority in finding a 
violation. 
City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 
(1994). 
Joined with the majority in finding a 
violation. 
COPYRIGHT 
Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 
(2012). 
Joined with the majority in finding no 
violation. 
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 
(2003). 
Joined with the majority in finding no 
violation. 
DEFAMATION 
Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, Inc. v. 
Conaughton, 491 U.S. 657 (1989). 
Writing a concurring opinion and 
joining with the Court, would have 
found no violation. 
Tory v. Cochran, 544 U.S. 734 
(2005). 
Joined with the majority in finding no 
violation. 
Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 
Inc., 501 U.S. 496 (1991). 
Writing for the Court, finding no 
violation. 
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 
U.S. 1 (1990). 
Joined with the majority in finding no 
violation. 
ELECTION LAW 
Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom 
Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 
(2011). 
Joined with the majority in finding a 
violation. 
Nev. Comm’n on Ethics v. Carrigan, 
131 S. Ct. 2343 (2011). 
Writing a concurring opinion, would 
have found no violation. 
Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010). Joined with the majority in finding no 
violation. 
Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 
876 (2010). 
Writing for the Court, found a violation 
but upheld other challenged portions. 
Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724 (2008). Joined with the majority in finding a 
violation. 
FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 
U.S. 449 (2007). 
Joined with the majority and Justice 
Scalia’s concurring opinion, finding a 
violation. 
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Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 
(2006). 
Writing a concurring opinion, would 
have found a violation. 
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 
(2003). 
Writing an opinion concurring in 
judgment in part and dissenting in part, 
would have found a violation. 
FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146 
(2003). 
Writing an opinion concurring in 
judgment, found no violation. 
Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 
536 U.S. 765 (2002). 
Writing a concurring opinion and 
joining with the Court, would have 
found a violation. 
FEC v. Col. Republican Fed. 
Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431 
(2001). 
Joined Justice Thomas’s dissenting 
opinion, would have found a violation.  
Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 
U.S. 377 (2000). 
Writing a dissenting opinion, would 
have found a violation. 
Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law 
Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, (1999). 
Joined with the majority in finding a 
violation. 
Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New 
Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997). 
Joined with the majority in finding no 
violation. 
Col. Republican Fed. Campaign 
Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604 (1996). 
Writing an opinion concurring in 
judgment and dissenting in part, would 
have found a violation. 
Morse v. Republican Party of Va., 517 
U.S. 186 (1996). 
Writing an opinion dissenting, would 
have found a violation. 
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 
514 U.S. 334 (1995). 
Joined with the majority, found a 
violation. 
Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 
(1992). 
Writing an opinion concurring and 
joining with the majority, found no 
violation. 
Austin v. Mich. Chamber of 
Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990). 
Writing an opinion dissenting, would 
have found a violation 
Eu v. S.F. Cnty. Democratic Cent. 
Comm., 489 U.S. 214 (1989). 
Joined with the majority in finding a 
violation. 
Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988). Joined with the majority in finding a 
violation. 
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS 
Presley v. Georgia, 130 S. Ct. 721 
(2010). 
Joined with the majority in finding a 
violation. 
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 
(2001). 
Joined with the majority in finding a 
violation. 
L.A. Police Dep’t v. United Reporting 
Pub. Corp., 528 U.S. 32 (1999). 
Joined Justice Stevens’ dissenting 
opinion, would have found a violation. 
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Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 
663 (1991). 
Joined with the majority, in finding no 
violation. 
Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 
(1989). 
Joined with the majority in finding a 
violation. 
HATE SPEECH 
Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 
(2011). 
Joined with the majority in finding a 
violation. 
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 
(2003). 
Joined Justice Souter’s opinion 
concurring in judgment in part and 
dissenting in part, found a violation 
(would have violated the law in its 
entirety). 
Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 
(1993). 
Joined with the majority in finding a 
violation. 
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 
377 (1992). 
Joined with the majority in finding a 
violation. 
JUDICIAL PROCESS 
Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 
U.S. 533 (2001). 
Writing for the Court, found a violation. 
El Vocero de Puerto Rico (Caribbean 
Intern. News Corp.) v. Puerto Rico, 
508 U.S. 147 (1993). 
Joined with the majority, finding a 
violation. 
Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 
1030 (1991). 
Wrote for the majority in part and 
dissented in part, would have had a 
violation. 
Butterworth v. Smith, 494 U.S. 624 
(1990). 
Joined with the majority, finding a 
violation. 
FTC v. Super. Ct. Trial Lawyers 
Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990). 
Joined with the majority, finding a 
violation. 
Univ. of Penn. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182 
(1990). 
Writing for the Court, found no 
violation 
LABOR LAW 
Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. 
Brown, 554 U.S. 60 (2008). 
Joined with the majority, finding a 
violation. 
Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass’n, 551 
U.S. 177 (2007). 
Joined with the majority, finding no 
violation. 
BE & K Const. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516 
(2002). 
Joined with the majority, finding a 
violation. 
Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, 500 
U.S. 507 (1991). 
Writing an opinion concurring in 
judgment in part and dissenting in part, 
finding a violation. 
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NATIONAL SECURITY 
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 
130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010). 
Joined with the majority, finding a 
violation. 
Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & 
Inst. Rights, 547 U.S. 47 (2006). 
Joined with the majority, finding a 
violation. 
OBSCENITY 
Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 
S. Ct. 2729 (2011). 
Joined with the majority, finding a 
violation. 
United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 
1577 (2010). 
Joined with the majority, finding a 
violation. 
United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 
285 (2008). 
Joined with the majority, finding no 
violation. 
Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656 
(2004). 
Writing for the majority, found a 
violation. 
Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 
(2002). 
Writing an opinion concurring in 
judgment and joining with the majority 
in finding no violation. 
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 
U.S. 234 (2002). 
Writing for the majority, found a 
violation. 
Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. 
Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998). 
Joined with the majority, finding no 
violation. 
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). Joined with the majority, finding a 
violation. 
United States v. X-Citement Video, 
Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (1994). 
Joined with the majority, finding no 
violation. 
Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 
544 (1993). 
Writing an opinion dissenting, would 
have found a violation. 
Ohio v. Osborne, 495 U.S. 103 
(1990). 
Joined with the majority, finding no 
violation. 
Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 
492 U.S. 115 (1989). 
Joined with the majority, finding a 
violation. 
Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 
489 U.S. 46 (1989). 
Joined with the majority, finding a 
violation and joined with the plurality.  
OBSCENITY/TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp. 
Ass’n, 529 U.S. 803 (2000). 
Writing for the majority, found a 
violation. 
OVERBREADTH 
Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113 
(2003). 
Joined the Court; found no violation. 
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Bd. of Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y. 
v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989). 
Joined with the majority in finding no 
First Amendment violation on 
overbreadth grounds, but remanded the 
case for a determination consistent with 
Central Hudson. 
PRISONERS’ SPEECH 
Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521 (2006). Joined with the majority, finding no 
violation. 
Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223 
(2001). 
Joined with the majority, finding no 
violation. 
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of 
N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 
U.S. 105 (1991). 
Writing an opinion concurring, found a 
violation. 
Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 
(1989). 
Joined with the majority, finding no 
violation. 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES 
Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 
S. Ct. 2488 (2011). 
Writing for the majority, found no 
violation. 
Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 555 
U.S. 353 (2009). 
Joined with the majority, finding no 
violation. 
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 
(2006). 
Writing for the majority, found no 
violation. 
City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 
(2004). 
Joined with the majority, finding no 
violation. 
Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Umberh, 518 
U.S. 668 (1996). 
Joined with the majority, finding a 
violation. 
United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. 
Union, 513 U.S. 454 (1995). 
Joined with the majority, finding a 
violation. 
Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661 
(1994). 
Joined Justice Scalia’s opinion 
concurring in judgment, found no 
violation. 
Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 
U.S. 62 (1990). 
Joined Justice Scalia’s opinion 
dissenting, would have found no 
violation. 
 PUBLIC EMPLOYEES/ASSOCIATION  
O’Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of 
Northlake, 518 U.S. 712 (1996). 
Writing for the majority, found a 
violation. 
PUBLIC FORUM 
Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the 
Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the 
Law v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 
(2010). 
Writing an opinion concurring and 
joined with the majority, found no 
violation. 
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Thomas v. Chicago Park Dist., 534 
U.S. 316 (2002). 
Joined with the majority, finding no 
violation. 
Good News Club v. Milford Cent. 
Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001). 
Joined with the majority, finding a 
violation. 
Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. 
Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998). 
Writing for the majority, found no 
violation. 
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of 
the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
Writing for the majority, found a 
violation. 
Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches 
Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 
(1993). 
Writing an opinion concurring in part 
and concurring in the judgment, found a 
violation. 
Int’l Soc’y for Krishna 
Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 
672 (1992). 
Writing an opinion concurring in 
judgment, found no violation. 
Lee v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna 
Consciousness, Inc., 505 U.S. 830 
(1992). 
Joined with the majority, found a 
violation. 
Forsyth County v. Nationalist 
Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992). 
Joined with the majority, found a 
violation. 
United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 
720 (1990). 
Writing an opinion concurring in 
judgment, found no violation. 
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 
U.S. 781 (1989). 
Writing for the majority, found no 
violation. 
Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 
(1988). 
Joined with the majority, found no 
violation. 
PUBLIC FORUM/COMPELLED SPEECH 
Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System 
v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000). 
Writing for the majority, found no 
violation. 
PUBLIC FORUM/OBSCENITY 
United States v. American Library 
Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194 (2003). 
Writing an opinion concurring in 
judgment, found no violation. 
STUDENTS’ SPEECH 
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 
(2007). 
Joined with the majority and Justice 
Alito’s concurring opinion, found no 
violation. 
SYMBOLIC CONDUCT 
City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 
277 (2000). 
Joined with the majority, found no 
violation. 
United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 
310 (1990). 
Joined with the majority, found a 
violation. 
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 
(1989). 
Writing an opinion concurring, found a 
violation. 
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TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 
U.S. 180 (1997). 
Writing for the majority, found no 
violation. 
Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439 
(1991). 
Joined with the majority, found no 
violation. 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS/OBSCENITY 
Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. 
Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 
727 (1996). 
Writing an opinion concurring in part, 
concurring in judgment in part, and 
dissenting in part, found a violation. 
ZONING OF ADULT ESTABLISHMENTS 
City of Littleton v. Z.J. Gifts D-4, 
LLC, 541 U.S. 774 (2004). 
Joined with the majority and Justice 
Souter’s opinion concurring in part and 
concurring in part, found no violation. 
City of Los Angeles v. Alameda 
Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425 (2002). 
Writing an opinion concurring in 
judgment, finding no violation. 
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 
560 (1991). 
Joined with the majority, found no 
violation. 
 
